In Re Dillon: Prima Facie Obviousness of Chemical Claims by Bradley, Gregory L.
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 2 Notes and Comments Article 2
January 1992
In Re Dillon: Prima Facie Obviousness of
Chemical Claims
Gregory L. Bradley
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gregory L. Bradley, In Re Dillon: Prima Facie Obviousness of Chemical Claims, 22 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1992).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss2/2
ARTICLES 
IN RE DILLON: PRIMA FACIE 
OBVIOUSNESS OF CHEMICAL 
CLAIMS 
By GREGORY L. BRADLEY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last forty years the courts and the Patent and 
Trademark Office ("PTO") have applied conflicting prima facie 
obviousness standards to chemical claims. This conflict came 
to a head in In re Dillon. 1 
Dillon's claims had been rejected as obvious by the Board 
of Patent Appeals and Interferences. On appeal, a panel of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed2 on the 
basis that the Board had used an incorrect standard for prima 
facie obviousness. The panel held that a prima facie case of 
obviousness is not made unless the claimed invention is 
"structurally similar"3 to the prior art reference, and there 
exists some suggestion in the prior art that the claimed 
invention will have the same or a similar utility as that 
discovered by the applicant.' 
©1991 Gregory L. Bradley. B.S.M.E. 1988, University of Pittsburgh; J.D. 1991, 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law. The author is an associate at the Intellectual 
Property law firm of Willian Brinks Olds Hofer Gilson & Lione in Chicago, Illinois. The 
author wishes to thank Professor Pamela Samuelson of the University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law and Jeffrey Duncan and John Crook of Willian Brinks Olds Hofer 
Gilson & Lione for their advice and suggestions when writing this article. This paper 
presents the current views of the author and does not necessarily represent those of 
Willian Brinks Olds Hofer Gilson & Lione. 
1. 919 F.2d 688, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
2. In re Dillon, 892 F.2d 1554, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
3. "Structural similarity" is a term used to describe chemical compounds that have 
very similar molecular structures. Chemical homologs and isomers are prime 
examples of structurally similar compounds. See In re Wilder, 563 F.2d 457,458 n. 
7, 195 U.S.P.Q. 426, 428 n. 7 (C.C.P.A. 1977) ("A 'homologous series' is a series of 
compounds whose structures differ regularly by the successive addition of the same 
chemical group .... Different compounds having the same molecular formula are called 
isomers. They contain the same numbers of the same kinds of atoms, but the atoms 
are attached to each other in different ways.") 
4. This standard will be referred to as the Dillon dissent standard. 
263 
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The PTO petitioned for rehearing and suggested rehearing 
en banc on February 12, 1990. This petition was approved and, 
on November 9,1990, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit issued an opinion reversing the earlier panel decision by 
a nine to three margin. 6 Circuit Judge Lourie, writing for the 
Dillon majority, formulated a standard for prima facie 
obviousness different from that announced in the prior Dillon 
decision. Under this standard, a chemical compound or 
composition that is "structurally similar" to the prior art, where 
the prior art provides motivation to invent the claimed compound 
or composition, is prima facie obvious. This prima facie case of 
obviousness may be rebutted by test data showing (1) that the 
claimed compound or composition possesses unexpectedly 
improved properties over the prior art or properties not actually 
possessed by the prior art, (2) that the prior art provides no 
motivation to make the "structurally similar" compound or 
composition, or (3) any other relevant argument. 8 
This standard was severely criticized by the Dillon dissent 
as being both contrary to the weight of precedent and the 
reincarnation of a disfavored prima facie obviousness standard 
of earlier years - structurally similar chemical compounds are 
prima facie obvious. 7 Instead, the dissent advocated using the 
prima facie obviousness standard announced in the earlier 
Dillon decision. 
Despite the dissent's assertions, the Dillon standard for 
prima facie obviousness has a sound base in precedent and 
promotes the integrity of chemical compound patents. The 
soundness of the Dillon standard, however, is not as apparent with 
respect to chemical composition and process claims and, quite 
probably, will increase chemical patent prosecution expenses. 
After reviewing the facts of the Dillon case, this paper 
will illustrate, by analysis of prior caselaw, that Dillon has not 
5. Judges Archer, Markey and Michel issued a concurring opinion in which 
they joined the majority in its formulation of the prima facie obviousness standard. 
6. This standard will be referred to as the Dillon standard. 
7. This standard will be referred to as the Hass-Henze doctrine of structural 
obviousness. "Structural obviousness· is a 'presumption of obviousness' (older term 
for prima facie obviousness) based on the structural similarity of claimed and prior 
art subject matter, and the assumption in chemistry that structurally similar 
compounds have similar properties. This 'presumption' could be rebutted by evidence 
showing that the prior art compound did not possess the property possessed by the 
claimed compound. See In re Hass, 141 F.2d 122, 60 U.S.P.Q. 544 (C.C.P.A. 1944); In 
re Henze, 181 F.2d 196, 85 U.S.P.Q. 261 (C.C.P.A. 1950). 
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revived the Hass-Henze doctrine of structural obviousness. 
Rather, Dillon will be revealed as having molded many years 
of sometimes inconsistent precedent into a coherent standard 
for prima facie obviousness. Subsequently, the legitimacy of the 
Dillon standard with respect to chemical compound, 
composition and process claims will be considered.s Finally, the 
effect of Dillon on patent prosecution costs, and other policy 
considerations, will be discussed. 
II. PRIMA FACIE OBVIOUSNESS 
At the outset, it must be emphasized that Dillon sets 
forth a standard for prima facie obviousness, not one for the 
patentability requirement of nonobviousness. The two concepts 
are legally distinct. As explained in In re Piasecki,B the seminal 
case explaining prima facie obviousness~ "[t]he concept of 
prima facie obviousness in ex parte patent examination is 
but a procedural mechanism to allocate in an orderly way 
the burdens of going forward and of persuasion as between the 
examiner and the applicant. "10 Thus, if the examiner produces 
factual evidence tending to prove the obviousness of the 
claimed invention, the prima facie obviousness showing has 
been made and the burden to rebut that showing falls upon the 
applicant. If adequate rebuttal evidence is produced, the 
holding of prima facie obviousness, being but a legal inference 
from previously uncontradicted evidence, is overcome. 
"Regardless of whether the prima facie case could have been 
characterized as strong or weak, the examiner must consider 
all the evidence anew. "11 
The final determination of obviousness, then, will rest 
upon consideration of all the relevant facts in evidence, 
including the objective factors considered in Graham,12 
uninfluenced by the examiner's earlier showing of a prima 
facie case. However, the failure on the applicant's part to 
8. For the sake of clarity, compound and composition claims will be treated 
separately even though compound claims are technically a subgroup of composition 
claims. 
9. 745 F.2d 1468,223 U.S.P.Q. 785 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
10. [d. at 1471-72, 223 U.S.P.Q. at 787-88. 
11. [d. at 1472,23 U.S.P.Q. at 788 (emphasis added). 
12. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (Court announced objective 
factors to be considered in the determination of non obviousness, including 'commercial 
success,' 'long-felt need,' and 'peer recognition.'). 
3
Bradley: In Re Dillon
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
266 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:263 
produce evidence sufficient to rebut the prima facie case will 
result in a final rejection of the applicant's claimed invention. 13 
III. THE DILLON CASE 
Dillon had applied for a patent on a composition comprising 
hydrocarbon fuel and tetra-orthoester14 compounds. Dillon 
claimed that the inclusion of the tetra-orthoester compounds 
in the hydrocarbon fuel composition would result in reduced 
particulate emissions during fuel combustion (i.e. reduced 
pollution). 
The combination of hydrocarbon fuel and tetra-orthoester 
compounds was not disclosed in the prior art, and the use of 
tetra-orthoesters to reduce particulate emissions was not 
suggested in the prior art. However, the prior art did disclose 
the use oftri-orthoester16 compounds in hydrocarbon fuels for 
the purpose of dewatering the fuels. Furthermore, additional 
prior art indicated that tri-orthoesters and tetra-orthoesters 
were chemically equivalent for use as water scavengers in 
hydraulic fluids. 
The PTO rejected Dillon's claims on the basis that the 
prior art references made them prima facie obvious. Since 
Dillon could not show some unexpected advantage or 
superiority of her claimed tetra-orthoester fuel compositions 
as compared with tri-orthoester fuel compositions, the PTO 
finally rejected Dillon's claims as being unpatentable for 
obviousness. 
The Dillon court affirmed the rejection of Dillon's claims. 
The court believed that the prior art had established "a 
sufficiently close relationship between the tri-orthoesters and 
tetra-orthoesters ... in the fuel oil art to create an expectation 
that hydrocarbon fuel compositions containing the tetra-esters 
would have similar properties ... to like compositions 
containing the tri-esters, and to provide the motivation to 
13. It should be emphasized that the procedural mechanism of prima facie 
obviousness is used for all patent claims, not just for chemical claims. 
14. A tetra-orthoester is a carbon atom to which four -OR groups are bonded. In 
the chemical formula, 0 represents an oxygen atom and R represents a monovalent 
organic radical comprising 1 to 20 carbon atoms. 
15. A tri-orthoester compound differs from a tetra-orthoester compound in that 
it has three -OR groups bonded to a central carbon atom. 
4
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make such new compositions. "16 The "motivation" provided by 
the prior art, together with the structural similarity between 
the claimed and prior art compositions, resulted in a showing 
of prima facie obviousness that Dillon was unable to rebut. 
IV. DILLON MAJORITY'S STANDARD IS CONSISTENT 
WITH PRIOR CASELAW 
The Dillon dissent strenuously argued that the majority 
was reviving the Hass-Henze doctrine of structural obviousness. 
The Dillon majority strongly denied the dissent's assertion and 
declared that its prima facie obviousness standard was based 
on precedent and long-established principles of patent law. 
Most likely, this interpretive conflict between the Dillon 
majority and dissent is a result of the prima facie obviousness 
standard's inconsistent development in the caselaw over the 
last forty years. 
Beginning with Hass-Henze and continuing into the 
present, the standard for prima facie obviousness has 
alternately shifted towards, and then away from, structural 
obviousness. Since a study of every case cited in the Dillon 
decision is exhausting,17 only a few of the most important 
cases will be analyzed here. This analysis shows that Dillon has 
a solid basis in precedent. 
A. ORIGINS OF STRUCTURAL OBVIOUSNESS 
It seems proper to begin the analysis with the cases where 
it all began: Hass and Henze. IS While these cases were actually 
decided almost six years apart, they are usually considered 
together when discussing the origins of structural obviousness. 
In Henze, the applicant claimed a compound that was the 
adjacent homolog of a prior art compound. Due to the similar 
chemical structures of homo logs and the "close relationship the 
physical and chemical properties of one member of a series 
bears to adjacent members,"19 the claimed compound was 
16. Dillon, 919 F.2d at 692, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1900-01 (emphasis added). 
17. The Dillon. dissent alone cited approximately forty-two cases. 
18. In. re Hass, 141 F:2d 122, 60 U.S.P.Q. 544 (C.C.P.A. 1944); In. re Henze, 181 
F.2d 196, 85 U.S.P.Q. 261 (C.C.P.A. 1950). 
19. Henze, 181 F.2d at 201, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 205. 
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rejected. The Henze court indicated that the structural 
obviousness of the claimed compound could be rebutted by 
evidence proving that the "claimed compound possesses 
unobvious or unexpected beneficial properties not actually 
possessed by the prior art homologue."2o.21 
Thus, under Hass-Henze, a compound is prima facie obvious 
ifit is structurally similar to a prior art compound. According 
to Hass-Henze, this prima facie showing may only be rebutted 
in one way: evidence showing that the prior art does not 
actually possess the properties possessed by the claimed 
compound. So viewed, it is readily apparent that the Hass-
Henze doctrine and the Dillon standard, while similar, are 
not identical. Specifically, in order for a prima facie case to be 
made under Dillon, more than structural similarity must be 
shown - the prior art must also provide motivation to the 
inventor to make the claimed invention. 
Furthermore, Dillon expands the categories of evidence 
permitted to rebut the prima facie case. In addition to the 
rebuttal evidence permitted under Hass-Henze/2 Dillon allows 
for rebuttal by: 1) evidence proving that the claimed compound 
possesses unexpectedly improved properties over the prior 
art, and 2) evidence showing that the prior art gives no 
motivation to make what appear to be obvious changes. Thus 
there are some major differences between the two standards; 
Dillon does not revive the Hass-Henze doctrine, it merely uses 
the doctrine as a foundation upon which to build its own prima 
facie obviousness standard. 
B. REBUTTAL EVIDENCE 
In re Papesch23 and In re ChUpp24 are important precedent, 
for each originated a specific category of rebuttal evidence 
embraced by the Dillon standard for prima facie obviousness. 
20.Id. 
21. In re Hass announced the same standard for prima facie obviousness as 
Henze: M[I]n order to be patentable. novel members of a homologous series of chemical 
compounds must possess some unobvious or unexpected beneficial properties not 
possessed by a homologous compound disclosed in the prior art." Hass. 141 F.2d at 
125.60 U.S.P.Q. at 547. 
22. Evidence showing that the claimed compound possesses unobvious or 
unexpected properties not actually possessed by the prior art. 
23. 315 F.2d 381. 137 U.S.P.Q. 42 (C.C.P.A. 1963). 
24. 816 F.2d 643. 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
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In Papesch, the claimed compound was a homolog of the 
prior art compound - the claimed and prior art subject matter 
were structurally similar. The examiner initially rejected the 
claims since they were obvious homologs of the claimed 
compounds. The applicant responded by filing an affidavit 
reporting that the claimed compound "is an active anti-
inflammatory agent while the prior art compound is completely 
inactive in that respect."26 The examiner finally rejected the 
claims, stating that the affidavit was not relevant as evidence 
to rebut the initial rejection. The only issue before the court on 
appeal was whether the examiner was required to entertain the 
evidence of nonobviousness presented in the affidavit. 
The Papesch court was concerned with whether the affidavit 
contained legitimate evidence of the type sufficient to rebut a 
prima facie obviousness case. The court believed that the 
"failure to take into consideration the biological or 
pharmaceutical property of the compounds as anti-
inflammatory agents ... [was a] fundamental error of law."26 
The court reasoned that "[a]n assumed similarity based on a 
comparison of [chemical compound formulae] must give way to 
evidence that the assumption is erroneous."27 In so holding, 
Papesch is support for the Dillon standard's allowance of 
rebuttal evidence showing that the prior art does not actually 
possess the property possessed by the claimed invention. 
Even though Papesch is irrelevant to the issue of the 
requirements for a prima facie obviousness case, the Dillon 
dissent quotes a passage of the decision to the effect that, in 
order for a prima facie obviousness case to be made, the prior 
art must "at least to a degree ... [disclose] the same desired 
property relied on for patentability in the new compound. "28 
While this passage may be dicta, it will be addressed because 
the Dillon dissent partly relies on it for its formulation of the 
prima facie obviousness standard. 
When read in context with the court's discussion preceding 
it, the quoted passage does not contradict the Dillon standard. 
The court's discussion was centered on the relationship between 
25. Papesch, 315 F.2d at 383, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 45. 
26. Id. at 391, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 51. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 392,137 U.S.P.Q. at 52 (emphasis omitted). Note that the Dillon dissent 
standard is a rewording of this passage. 
7
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prima facie obviousness and the ultimate question of patentability. 
The Papesch court, quoting In re Henze, said: "[p]atentability is not 
resolved conclusively even where unexpected or unobvious 
beneficial properties are established to exist in novel members of 
a homologous series over prior art members, as the circumstances 
may require a consideration of other factors.29 That the prior art 
disclosed "at least to a degree ... the same desired property relied 
on for patentability in the new compound" is mentioned by the 
Papesch court as being one of the 'other factors' bearing on the 
obviousness of a compound.30 Since these 'other factors' may be 
considered in determining the ultimate question of nonobviousness 
and, hence, of patentability, they have no bearing on the 
determination of the prima facie obviousness case - prima facie 
obviousness and patentability are two distinct legal concepts. As 
the Dillon majority said in response to the dissent's assertion, 
"Papesch indeed stated that a compound and all of its properties 
are inseparable and must be considered in the determination of 
obviousness. We heartily agree and intend not to retreat from 
Papesch one inch. "31 
In ChUpp,32 the applicant claimed a compound that was 
structurally similar (a homolog) to a prior art compound. Both 
the claimed and prior art compounds displayed herbicidal 
activity. The examiner concluded that the prior art compound 
rendered the claimed compound prima facie obvious. The 
applicant attempted to rebut the prima facie case by submitting 
undisputed test data showing that the claimed compound 
possessed at least five times the level of herbicidal activity as did 
the prior art compound. The examiner, and later the Board of 
Patent Appeals, rejected the claims on the basis that the 
applicant's rebuttal evidence was insufficient to rebut the prima 
facie case. 
The Chupp court strongly disagreed with the Board: "Evidence 
that a compound is unexpectedly superior in one of a spectrum of 
common properties, as here, can be enough to rebut a prima 
facie case of obviousness ... based on structural similarities."33 
29. Papesch, 315 F.2d at 392, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 52, quoting In re Henze, 181 
F.2d 196,201,85 U.S.P.Q. 261, 264·65 (C.C.P.A. 1950). 
30.Id. 
31. Dillon, 919 F.2d at 697,16 U.S.P.Q. at 1905. 
32. 816 F.2d 643, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
33. Chupp, 816 F.2d at 646, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1439. See also In re Murch, 464 F.2d 
1051, 175 U.S.P.Q. 89 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (Proof that claimed compound had unexpectedly 
improved weld line toughness as compared to structurally similar prior art compound 
held sufficient evidence to rebut a prima facie obviousness case). 
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The inclusion of "unexpectedly superior properties" as 
allowable rebuttal evidence illustrates, again, that the Dillon 
standard is consistent with prior caselaw. The Dillon dissent's 
assertion that the Hass-Henze doctrine is being revived is 
incorrect, especially in view of the expanded categories of 
rebuttal evidence permitted under the Dillon standard. At 
most, the Dillon majority is guilty of taking the Hass-Henze 
doctrine and improving it. Realistically, Dillon is a refined 
culmination of occasionally inconsistent caselaw and thought 
on "chemical obviousness." 
C. DILLON MOTIVATION REQUIREMENT 
The basis for the Dillon standard's motivation requirement 
may be found in In re Mod,3' a case factually very similar to the 
Dillon case, and In re Stemniski. 36 
In Mod, a homolog of a prior art compound was claimed. The 
claimed compound possessed antimicrobial properties, whereas 
the prior art compound disclosed only insecticidal properties. 
Due to the structural similarity of the claimed and prior art 
compounds and the belief that this close similarity would 
suggest to an inventor the making of the claimed compound, the 
Mod court determined the compounds to be prima facie obvious. 
The Mod opinion sets forth the two elements required for 
prima facie obviousness under the Dillon standard: structural 
similarity between the claimed and prior art subject matter, and 
motivation in the prior art to make the claimed invention. The 
Mod court explained that it had "not relied on so-called structural 
obviousness of the claimed compounds alone in support of its 
conclusions .... Indeed, the examiner thought the compounds 
of the claims 'would be expected to possess the same properties' 
as [the prior art reference] discloses .... 36 Thus, Mod specifically 
rejected the Hass-Henze doctrine of structural obviousness and 
also required, as Dillon now does, the element of motivation to 
create a p,:ima facie obviousness case. 
The Dillon dissent attempted to distinguish Mod on the 
basis that it was not relevant to the determination of a prima 
34. 408 F.2d 1055, 161 U.S.P.Q. 281 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
35. 444 F.2d 581,170 U.S.P.Q. 343 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
36. Mod, 408 F.2d at 1056, 161 U.S.P.Q. at 283. 
9
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facie case. While Mod did not explicitly refer to a prima facie 
obviousness issue, a fair reading of the decision shows that 
impliedly the Mod court was considering a prima facie 
obviousness case. For example, Mod quot~s the In re Henze 
decision as indicating that the "burden is on the applicant to 
show that the claimed compound possesses ... unexpected 
beneficial properties not actually possessed by a prior art 
homolog.37 Since prima facie obviousness is a burden-allocating 
device between the examiner and applicant, and the Mod 
court, as stated in the above-quoted passage, was questioning 
whether the applicant carried his burden, the Mod court could 
not have been discussing anything but a prima facie case 
when it made its decision. Furthermore, the last passage of the 
Mod decision shows the interplay between the burdens of 
proof and rebuttal in a prima facie case: "[T]here is no evidence 
here, however, to contradict the conclusion that the present 
compounds are obvious insecticides ... and thus have been 
effectively placed in the public domain by [the prior art 
reference] who provides adequate motivation to those of 
ordinary skill to make them. "38 The terms 'conclusion' and 
'contradict' are direct references to the showing of a prima facie 
obviousness case and evidence required to rebut that showing, 
respectively. 
In Stemniski,39 an applicant claimed compounds having 
antioxidantal properties that were structurally similar to 
prior art compounds. The examiner, utilizing the Hass-Henze 
doctrine, held that a prima facie case of obviousness was 
established based on the structural similarity between the 
claimed and prior art compounds. The applicant neither 
attempted to rebut the prima facie obviousness case with 
evidence establishing that the claimed compounds possessed 
properties different from those actually possessed by the prior 
art compounds, nor did he attempt to establish that the claimed 
compounds in fact possessed improved properties over the 
prior art compounds.40 Needless to say, the examiner finally 
rejected all the claims on the basis of obviousness. 
On appeal, the applicant argued that the prior art 
references provided no motivation to invent the claimed 
37.Id. 
38. Id. at 1057,161 U.S.P.Q. at 283. 
39. 444 F.2d 581,170 U.S.P.Q. 343 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
40. One should note that these categories ofrebuttal evidence are identical to 
the ones permitted under the Dillon standard. 
10
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compound. Not only did the prior art not disclose antioxidant 
effectiveness as a utility, the prior art did not disclose any 
utility whatsoever for the compounds. In other words, the 
applicant was asking, 'how can a prima facie obviousness case 
be made when the prior art provides no logical reason to make 
the claimed invention?' 
The Stemniski court was impressed with the applicant's 
argument: 
Where the prior art reference neither 
discloses nor suggests a utility for certain 
described compounds, why should it be said 
that a reference makes obvious to one of 
ordinary skill in the art an isomer, homolog 
or analog of related structure, when that 
mythical, but intensely practical, person 
knows of no 'practical' reason to make the 
reference compounds, much less any 
structurally related compounds? How can 
there be obviousness of structure ... when 
no apparent purpose or result is to be 
achieved, no reason or motivation to be 
satisfied, upon modifying the reference 
compounds'structure?4! 
Ultimately, the Stemniski court held that an applicant is 
entitled to a patent "where, as here, the prior art does not 
disclose or suggest any usefulness for the compounds it 
describes and the applicant does describe a usefulness 
conforming with statutory requirements for closely related 
but novel compounds he discloses. "42 
While Stemniski strongly asserts that motivation is to be 
considered in the examiner's analysis, it does not definitely 
state where in the procedural make-up of the analysis 
motivation is to be considered. In other words, is motivation 
required in order for a prima facie obviousness case to be 
made or is motivation (or lack thereof) only to be considered as 
rebuttal evidence to the prima facie obviousness case? This 
confusion is documented in a number of passages in the 
Stemniski opinion. The Court itself admits that: 
41. Stemniski, 444 F.2d at 586,170 U.S.P.Q. at 347 (emphasis added). 
42. [d. at 587,170 U.S.P.Q. at 348. 
11
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[I]t is not an easy matter to determine 
whether we have before us a case in which 
the evidence adduced by the patent office to 
establish a prima facie case of obviousness 
is inadequate ab initio or whether the 
greater error lies in the failure to consider 
appellant's discovery of a new ... usefulness 
for the claimed compounds as adequate 
rebuttal evidence of that prima facie case in 
a situation where, as here, the ... prior art 
neither discloses nor renders obvious a 
usefulness for the compounds it describes.43 
The court, however, fails to state explicitly to which of the 
above situations the case pertains. 
The Dillon majority appears to have been somewhat 
confused by the analysis in Stemniski. After reviewing the 
Dillon standard, one will notice that there are motivation 
'elements' in both the requirements for a prima facie 
obviousness case and in the types of evidence permitted to rebut 
a prima facie obviousness case. A passage from Dillon will shed 
some light on what the majority believed to be the proper 
"position" for the motivation element in the prima facie 
obviousness procedural device: "Stemniski, rather than 
destroying the established practice of rejecting closely-related 
compounds as prima facie obvious, qualified it by holding that 
a presumption [of obviousness] is not created when the 
reference compound is so lacking in any utility that there is no 
motivation to make close relatives."«·Thus, thepillon majority 
obviously thought that the Stemniski motivation element was 
meant as an added requirement for prima facie obviousness. 
In light of the Dillon majority's interpretation, one could 
infer that the Dillon standard's motivation requirement is 
only unfulfilled when the prior art discloses no utility. 
Nevertheless, Dillon should not be construed in this manner. 
The number of prior art references, especially prior art patents, 
that disclose no utility for its subject matter will, and should, 
be very limited. (A patent disclosing no utility for the invention 
therein should be invalid.) If this is, in fact, how the Dillon 
43. Id. at 585,170 U.S.P.Q. at 347. 
44. Dillon, 919 F.2d at 697, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1904-05 (emphasis added). 
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majority is construing the motivation requirement, the Dillon 
standard would be almost identical to the Hass-Henze doctrine 
of structural obviousness, the only difference between the two 
being the expanded categories of rebuttal evidence permitted 
by the Dillon standard. 
Nevertheless, a quote from Dillon indicates the majority's 
belief that the motivation requirement's application would 
not be limited to those instances when the prior art disclosed 
no utility: "Properties ... are relevant to the creation of a prima 
facie case in the sense of affecting the motivation of a researcher 
to make compounds closely related to or suggested by a prior 
t d "45 ar compoun .... 
D. MOTIVATION AS A CATEGORY OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE 
An additional consideration remains with respect to the 
motivation requirement, namely the reason for what appears 
to be two motivation elements within the Dillon standard. If, 
as previously stated, the Dillon majority interpreted the 
motivation element as being an added requirement for prima 
facie obviousness, why, then, does a motivation element appear 
as a category of rebuttal evidence in the Dillon standard? 
While the Dillon majority did not discuss the reason for this 
apparent inconsistency, it may be explained as follows. After 
initial review of an applicant's patent application, the examiner 
has the burden of providing factual evidence in support of his 
prima facie obviousness determination. The examiner may, 
under the Dillon stan"dard, support his prima facie 
determination by showing that prior art references, structurally 
similar to the claimed invention, provide motivation for the 
applicant to make the claimed invention. The applicant may 
submit to the examiner's finding of structural similarity, but 
he may not agree with the examiner's motivation 
determination. The applicant, in this case, would then argue 
that the prior art does not provide motivation for a likely 
inventor to produce the claimed invention. That argument 
would be permissible rebuttal evidence under the Dillon 
standard.46 The Dillon majority realized that this argument 
would arise under its standard and they made provision for it 
45. [d., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1905. 
46. This argument would not be permissible rebuttal evidence under the Hass· 
Henze doctrine of structural obviousness. 
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by including a 'motivation category' in permissible rebuttal 
evidence. 
V. ANALYSIS OF CHEMICAL CLAIMS 
Before analyzing the soundness of the Dillon standard as 
applied to chemical claims, a few important points must first 
be introduced. First, as previously noted:7 it is assumed in both 
chemistry and patent law that structurally similar chemical 
compounds will have similar physical and chemical properties.48 
Second, in any analysis under the patent laws, a chemical 
compound and its properties are indivisible. While the chemical 
formula "may serve in a claim to identify what is being 
patented. The thing that is patented is not the formula but the 
compound identified by it. "49 Finally, the scope of patent 
protection differs between compound, composition, and process 
patents. The scope of protection for compound and composition 
patents is not limited to the disclosed use of the compound or 
composition. Rather, the patent protects the disclosed use and 
all other properties/uses of the compound or composition. On 
the other hand, the scope of a process patent is limited to the 
use claimed for the compound or composition; patent protection 
is not granted to the underlying compound or composition. 
As can be seen, compound and composition patents are more 
desirable than process patents since they offer an extended 
range of protection. The above-stated "rules" are helpful in 
understanding the consequences of Dillon. 
Applying the "rules" to different examples of chemical 
claims will help to illustrate the impact of the Dillon standard 
and to determine its legitimacy in various practical 
applications. This analysis will begin with an example of a 
compound claim and will then address examples of composition 
and process claims. 
A. COMPOUND CLAIMS 
Let us suppose that A discovers a compound X that is 
useful as rat poison. Prior art compound Y is a homolog of X 
(i.e., it is structurally similar to X) and is disclosed as being an 
47. See supra note 8. 
48. This doctrine will be referred to as the "common properties- assumption. 
49. Papesch, 315 F.2d at 391, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 51. 
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anti-viral agent. Under the Dillon dissent standard,60 X would 
not be prima facie obvious since there is no suggestion in the 
prior art that X would be useful as rat poison. On the other 
hand, the Dillon standard would find X to be prima facie 
obvious. Since X and Yare structurally similar, there is a 
presumption they will have similar properties. A, being of 
'ordinary skill in the art,' would be motivated to make a 
compound similar to Y in the hopes that the new compound 
would also be harmful to organisms (albeit larger ones). A 
could rebut the prima facie case against X by showing either 
that Y was not a rat poison or that X was a far superior rat 
poison than Y. 
Two scenarios immediately present themselves. In scenario 
one, Y is not a rat poison or, ifit is, it is a relatively ineffective 
one. In this case, both the Dillon and Dillon dissent standards 
produce the same results. X is patentable. This result is good. 
A has advanced the useful arts by discovering the unknown rat 
poison, X. 
In scenario two, Y is a fairly strong rat poison. Under the 
Dillon standard, X is not patentable - A cannot show that X's 
rat poison property is unexpectedly superior to Y's. In contrast, 
X would be patentable under the Dillon dissent standard, 
since there was no suggestion in the prior art that a compound 
structurally similar to Y would be a useful rat poison. This is 
bad. Y is a rat poison, even though that use was not disclosed 
in the patent. In patent law, though, it is the compound, and 
all of its inherent properties, that is patented. By granting a 
patent to A on X, the Dillon dissent would be taking "obvious" 
compound X out of the public domain. 
In this second scenario, X and Y had similar properties. 
Since structurally similar compounds are assumed by those 
'skilled in the art' to have similar properties, and X and Y did 
in fact possess such properties, what "invention" deserving a 
patent was there in making compound X?61 Furthermore, let us 
not forget that compound Y's patentee has an exclusive right 
to Y and its properties and uses. Do we not undermine the scope 
ofY's patent protection by allowing X to be patented? Looking 
at it another way, how many properties do X and Y have in 
50. See pp. 1·2 for the Dillon dissent standard. 
51. If you say 'the unobvious use of previously unknown, but obvious, compound 
X as a rat poison,' you are correct, but will have to wait until the discussion of process 
claims. 
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common? So far, we know only of one similar use - rat poison. 
Since structurally similar compounds are assumed to have 
similar properties, isn't it possible that X and Y share many 
common properties? Suppose A knew that X was an anti-viral 
agent and wanted to produce and use X as such. A would be 
prohibited from doing so due to the patent on structurally 
similar compound Y. 
By placing the burden on the applicant to rebut the 
"common properties" assumption of structural similar 
compounds, the Dillon standard prevents the following 
detrimental results from occurring in chemical compound 
prosecution: diminution of the public domain, undermining of 
patent protection, and issuance of unwarranted patents. 
Importantly, those applicants truly deserving of a patent for 
their claimed compounds (i.e., those able to rebut the prima 
facie obviousness case with evidence of unexpected superior 
properties, etc.) are rewarded for their efforts under Dillon. 
B. COMPOSITION CLAIMS 
The analysis of composition claims follows much the same 
pattern as that of compound claims. In order to analyze a 
"real-world" situation, let us use the composition claim at 
issue in Dillon as our example. Recalling the Dillon facts, 
Dillon claimed a composition comprising a hydrocarbon fuel and 
a tetra-orthoester for use as a particulate emission reducer 
during fuel combustion. The prior art disclosed a composition 
comprising a hydrocarbon fuel and a tri-orthoester for use as 
a dewatering agent, but did not suggest a use as a particulate 
emission reducer. Tri- and tetra-orthoesters are structurally 
similar compounds and the prior art disclosed the chemical 
equivalence of the two compounds. Therefore, the "common 
properties" assumption appeared justified. 
As we know, the Dillon court found the claimed composition 
prima facie obvious. Dillon did not rebut the prima facie 
showing and the claim was rejected for obviousness. The Dillon 
dissent, however, would not have found the claimed composition 
prima facie obvious since the prior art did not suggest the 
use of tetra-orthoesters as particulate emission reducers. 
Presumably, the claimed composition would have been 
patentable under the Dillon dissent standard. 
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For the same reasons as discussed in the compound claim 
example, the Dillon dissent result would be incorrect. Since tri-
orthoesters were known as being dewatering agents in 
hydrocarbon fuel compositions, it would thus be obvious, under 
the common properties assumption, that tetra-orthoesters 
were also useful as dewatering agents. However, granting a 
patent to Dillon on the claimed composition would give her 
unwarranted protection for use of tetra-orthoesters as 
dewatering agents. It is irrelevant that her composition was 
only claimed as being useful for particulate emission reduction 
since a compound or composition claim may not be limited to 
a specific use. 
While the result under the Dillon standard appears 
legitimate with respect to the specific composition claim in issue 
in that case, the Dillon standard must be carefully applied to 
composition claims in general. 
The Dillon standard is primarily based on the "common 
properties" assumption. This assumption is useful when only 
one substance (i.e., a chemical compound) is being compared 
against prior art for a prima facie obviousness determination. 
However, when two or more substances are claimed together 
(i.e., a chemical composition claim) the "common properties" 
assumption is not as legitimate. A simple example will 
illustrate this idea: "When two chemical elements, such as 
sodium and chlorine, combine chemically to form sodium 
chloride, the resulting product has none of the physical or 
chemical characteristics of the elements from which it was 
formed. "62 Thus, it is extremely difficult to predict the properties 
of a chemical composition from the individual properties of one 
of the composition's constituents. 
The above-stated "exception" to the common properties 
assumption appears to seriously undermine the legitimacy of 
the Dillon standard as applied to chemical composition claims. 
Nevertheless, Dillon, as stated previously, will remain 
legitimate with respect to composition claims if applied 
carefully. 
Referring once again to the Dillon facts, we will discover 
that the common properties assumption is still valid in that 
52. A. W. Deller, 3 PATENT CLAIMS 39 (2d ed. 1971). 
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case. The prior art disclosed a composition of hydrocarbon 
fuel and tri-orthoesters and the claimed composition was 
comprised of hydrocarbon fuel and tetra-orthoesters. 
Comparing the prior art and the claim, we see that in both cases 
structurally similar compounds are combined with hydrocarbon 
fuel. Using a double common properties approach, we can 
reason that since tri- and tetra-orthoesters should have 
common properties, they should react with hydrocarbon fuel in 
a like manner so that the resulting compositions have similar 
properties. 
On the other hand, had the Dillon prior art only disclosed 
a composition of hydraulic fluid and tri-orthoesters, it does not 
appear that the common properties assumption, and thus the 
prima facie obviousness showing, would be valid. Since the 
prior art did not disclose what properties or use would result 
from a composition of hydrocarbon fuel and tri-orthoesters, how 
would an examiner be able to predict with any certainty the use 
of a composition comprising hydrocarbon fuel and compounds 
(tetra-orthoesters) structurally similar to tri-orthoesters? It is 
reasonable to assume that the structurally similar compounds 
(tri- and tetra-orthoesters) would react quite differently with 
hydraulic fluids and hydrocarbon fuel, with different properties 
being the result. In this case, there would be no prima facie 
obviousness. 
Strict Dillon adherents may suggest that the burden be 
placed upon the applicant to show that the common properties 
assumption is inapplicable. This would not be a correct 
interpretation of Dillon, for the Dillon standard of prima facie 
obviousness is based on the accuracy of the common properties 
assumption. The above suggestion would, in fact, create a 
new and different standard for prima facie obviousness -
placing the entire burden on the applicant to prove the 
patentability of his invention. Regardless of the patent policy 
considerations affected by this new standard, it would appear 
to run afoul of §102's grant of an affirmative right to a patent.53 
C. PROCESS CLAIMS 
The analysis of process claims follows a much different 
route than that of compound and composition claims. In Dillon, 
53. 35 U.S.C. §102 (1984) (MA person shall be entitled to a patent unless· .... ") 
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Dillon had claimed a process of reducing particulate emissions 
from hydrocarbon fuel combustion, comprising combusting a 
composition of tetra-orthoesters and hydrocarbon fuel. The 
Dillon court did not consider the patentability of the process 
claims because, for technical reasons, they were not considered 
by the Board of Patent Appeals.64 Regardless, the application 
of the Dillon standard to a process claiming a new use for a 
compound or composition structurally similar to a prior art 
compound or composition is not legitimate. 
Consider again the compound claim example and the 
question raised therein concerning inventor A's actual 
invention. Ns patentable invention was not compound X for use 
as a rat poison; compound X was "obvious" and one cannot 
obtain a compound or composition patent limited to a certain 
use. Instead, Ns invention was the unobvious use of previously 
unknown, but obvious, compound X as a rat poison. 
Likewise, Dillon's true invention was the use of the 
unknown, but obvious, composition of tetra-orthoester and 
hydrocarbon fuel as a particulate emission reducer. Assuming 
that the process prior art was similar in scope to the 
composition prior art referred to in Dillon, application of the 
Dillon standard would result in Dillon's process claim being 
found prima facie obvious.66 Dillon would be required to produce 
evidence proving that her process was new and unobvious, 
even though the use was not disclosed in the prior art. 
Importantly, the current patent statutes permit new and 
unobvious uses to be claimed, and patented, as processes. 35 
U.S.C. §lOl states that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process ... may obtain a patent therefor .... " 
Process is defined as meaning any "process, art or method, and 
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, or material."66 Therein lies the solution 
to the problem concerning how to protect inventors discovering 
new and unobvious uses of obvious compounds or compositions: 
grant them process patents. This idea has been advocated 
before: 
54. See Dillon, 919 F.2d at 694-95, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1903. 
55. The analysis used in the composition claim example would be identical, 
except for the fact that processes, instead of compositions, would be compared. 
56. 35 U.S.C. §100(b) (1984). 
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It is basic to the grant of a patent that the 
scope of a patent should not exceed the scope 
of the invention ... To say that a person who 
has discovered a new use for a structurally 
obvious compound, which compound would 
not have been entitled to any patent 
protection absent the new use, should 
receive a patent on the compound itself is to 
extend the patent monopoly far beyond the 
reason for its existence. We. think that the 
purposes of the patent law will be 
adequately served if patents on compounds 
which are structurally obvious from the 
prior art are limited to method patents 
directed to the new and useful characteristic 
or property which is the essence of the 
discovery or invention.67 
This solution promotes two basic patent policies: it rewards 
inventors for the discovery of new uses for obvious or known art 
and, since process patents are limited in scope to the disclosed 
process, the inventor is not given a patent greater in scope then 
his invention.68 
VI. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Dillon requires the submission of test data as evidence to 
rebut a prima facie case. This requirement will further increase 
the costs of patent prosecution. Even though the extra burden 
Dillon places upon applicants will promote the integrity of 
chemical compound patents, and composition patents in the 
correct situation, is it desirable to devise a burden-allocating 
standard that increases costs to applicants? Will the benefit of 
"better" patents outweigh the "cost" to our patent system of 
applicants with limited resources possibly being foreclosed 
from patent prosecution due to cost alone? Judge Johnson, 
writing for the In re Henze court in 1950, hinted at this concern 
when discussing the availability to the applicant of rebuttal 
evidence: " ... [I]n the absence of such data, the assignee of 
applicant's patent application, the Parke, Davis Company, 
might reasonably be expected to have the resources to conduct 
57. Mon8anto Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 312 F. Supp. 778, 790-91,164 U.S.P.Q. 
556, 566 (E.n. Pa. 1970). 
58. Or, in other words, the public domain is not unjustifiably diminished. 
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such tests as would be required. "69 This quote brings two 
thoughts to mind. First, Judge Johnson believed, in 1950, 
that the requirement of rebuttal test evidence might be too 
costly for some individual applicants to bear alone. If Judge 
Johnson could accept that possibility then, should we be overly 
concerned now? Second, Judge Johnson thought that the 
applicant's assignee would have sufficient resources to perform 
the required tests if needed. This statement, combined with the 
notion that a large proportion of patent applications are backed 
by companies with sufficient funds to see the prosecution 
through to the end, suggests that the concern for individual 
applicants would be easily outweighed by the benefits the 
Dillon standard offers. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Dillon standard has a strong basis in precedent and 
does not strictly revive the Hass-Henze doctrine of structural 
obviousness. Any discrepancy between Dillon and earlier 
caselaw may be explained by the inconsistent development of 
the caselaw on chemical obviousness over the years. 
With respect to compound claims, and composition claims 
in particular situations, the Dillon standard will promote the 
integrity of chemical patents and prevent the unjustified 
erosion of the public domain. However, since the patent statutes 
specifically permit new and unobvious uses of old or obvious 
compounds or compositions to be patented, the Dillon standard 
should not be applied to process claims. 
Finally, the Dillon standard's requirement of test data 
will increase the costs of patent prosecution, possibly with 
the effect of foreclosing the entry of individual applicants, or 
small companies, with limited resources into the patent process. 
While this is an unfortunate "cost" to be borne, it appears 
that it will be outweighed by the benefits the Dillon standard 
will provide to our patent system. 
59. Henze, 181 F.2d at 201,85 U.S.P.Q. at 265. 
21
Bradley: In Re Dillon
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
